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Abstract— It becomes essential when reasoning about the 
security risks to critical utilities such electrical power and 
water distribution to recognize that the interests of 
producers and consumers do not fully coincide. They may 
have incentives to behave strategically towards each other, 
as well as toward some third party adversary. We therefore 
argue for the need to extend the prior literature, which has 
concentrated on the strategic, adaptive game between 
adversary and defender, towards 3-player games. But it 
becomes hard to justify modelling a population of 
consumers as a single, decision making actor. So we also 
show how we can model consumers as a group of mutually-
influencing, yet not centrally co-ordinated, heterogeneous 
agents. And we suggest how this representation can be 
integrated into a game-theoretic framework. This requires a 
framework in which payoffs are known by the players only 
stochastically. We present some basic models and 
demonstrate the nature of the modelling commitments that 
need to be made in order to reason about utilities’ security 
risk. 
Index Terms – Security, utilities, game theory, agent-based 
model. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Industrial control systems have become increasingly 
vulnerable to cyber-attacks due to their interconnection 
with insecure corporate networks. The risk is particular 
serious for critical utilities such as water and electricity 
distribution systems. The recent attack in the Ukraine [1] 
illustrated how attackers could ultimately gain physical 
control over such a system and inflict widespread harm on 
a society that is heavily dependent on basic commodities 
and services. 
How to assess this risk has emerged as a problem of 
significant interest in recent years, drawing from the more 
general literature on assessing risk from deliberate attacks 
– called ‘adversarial risk analysis’ [2, 3] to distinguish it 
from the traditional ‘probabilistic risk analysis’. This shift 
in thinking about the risk agent as being an adaptive, 
strategic actor rather than chance failure has, in particular, 
led to the use of adversary-defender games to analyse risk 
in utility systems [4, 5].  
Our claim is that producers and consumers of a utility 
have interests that do not completely coincide. They may 
act strategically towards each other, and this possibility 
can be of considerable importance. For example, a 
producer might not disclose a threat to its consumers in 
order to avoid a panic response that might lead to over-
consumption and exacerbation of an attack. Consumers 
might exaggerate the harm they experience in order to 
make compensation claims. Either strategy might 
influence the payoff to the adversary. Thus there are 
various possibilities for producers and consumers to act 
strategically and adaptively towards each other as well as 
towards a third party adversary. We explore these in this 
paper, showing in a basic way how they can be modelled, 
and indicating the nature of the games that need to be 
represented. 
However, when we separate the interests of producer 
and consumer as distinct players, we encounter the 
problem that the consumer, in reality, is not a unitary 
decision maker, but a set of heterogeneous agents that 
influence each other, without central coordination, 
through a social network. We therefore also show how an 
agent-based model of consumers can be integrated into the 
overarching game. Such a model is inherently stochastic 
in nature because the specific characteristics of 
heterogeneous agents that shape their risk responses are 
randomly endowed. This means that the populations’ 
responses are probability distributions, and the game 
between the utility and adversary has stochastic payoffs 
that need to be indexed appropriately to analyse the game. 
In the remainder of this paper, we suggest key 
scenarios, show how these can be represented as a game, 
show how we can replace one player with an agent-based 
model of responding, and show how the outcomes this 
produces can be integrated back into a game. We briefly 
discuss the main insights that this work yields. 
II. THE ADVERSARY-PRODUCER-CONSUMER 
INTERACTION 
A. The first scenario: the threat of an attack 
 The clearest scenario involves a system such as a water 
utility whose control systems are under threat from a 
specific, directed cyber-attack – an example of which can 
be found in the Maroochy case [6]. The focus is on the 
strategies of adversary and utility and the payoffs combine 
the costs of attack and defence with the harms arising 
from an attack. The complication is that consumers also 
make choices relevant to their payoffs and the payoffs of 
others. For example, they may choose to boil 
contaminated drinking water when warned to do so, or 
they may substitute bottled water. The costs and harms 
they experience produce gains for the adversary and losses 
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for the utility. And the adversary and utility choose 
strategies in the knowledge that consumers make such 
choices and influence their own payoffs.  
The extensive form of this scenario in its simplest form 
is shown in Fig. 1. The attacker has a choice of whether to 
attack or not. The utility simultaneously has two choices: 
first, whether to enhance or just maintain its defences; 
second, whether to amplify the risk in its communications 
with the consumer, admit the objective level of risk, or 
attenuate it. The consumer receives a risk communication 
containing a risk level, but it does not know if this is an 
amplification or attenuation of the objective value. So it 
must simultaneously choose how to interpret it (by 
inflating it on the assumption that it was attenuated, 
accepting it as it is, or discounting it on the assumption 
that it was amplified). In this representation, the 
consumer's strategies concern its choices about how to 
interpret communications, not choices about whether to 
protect itself. Protection, or not, follows the interpretation 
choice. 
We assume that if the attack takes place, there is an 
objective probability B of harm H to the consumer if the 
utility does not enhance its defences. This probability is 
reduced by a factor D < 1 if the utility does enhance the 
defences at cost K. The consumer incurs H with 
probability B or DB unless it takes its own precautions 
(such as boiling drinking water, or substituting bottled 
water) at cost C. We also assume that if the utility chooses 
to amplify the objective risk it will communicate a risk 
message M = 2B, and to attenuate 0.5B. If the consumer 
chooses to inflate the communicated risk M the consumer 
will believe the risk is 2M and if it chooses to discount it 
will believe the risk is 0.5M. 
To define the consumer's payoffs, we give the 
consumer a threshold level, T. The consumer takes 
precautionary action only when its belief L about 
probability of incurring the objective harm H exceeds this. 
Thus, for example, in a state in which the utility's strategy 
is to enhance defences and amplify the risk, with the 
consumer choosing to inflate the communicated risk, the 
consumer will believe the risk is 4B. It will not protect 
itself if 4B < T, anticipating it will incur a payoff -4BDH. 
If T < 4B, on the other hand, the consumer will protect 
itself at a cost of C and incur no harm.  
The payoff to the utility is the possible cost of defence 
K, plus some proportion E1 < 1 of the cost incurred by a 
consumer that decides to protect itself at cost C, plus some 
proportion E2 < 1 of the harm incurred by the consumer. 
This sharing of the consumer's costs reflects loss of 
goodwill and reputational damage, so the consumer’s 
costs are not reduced by this sharing. Any monetary 
compensation, not represented here, from utility to 
consumers, would reduce the consumer’s losses by this 
amount. The factors Ei also reflect the way in which the 
consumer's protective action could damage the utility's 
interests – for example if consumers boycotted the utility's 
product. But the utility has a different view of the 
probability of an unprotected consumer incurring H, 
knowing it to be B, not L. So, for example, when the 
consumer is anticipating a payoff of -4BDH the utility 
knows the payoff to be –BDH (even though it knows the 
consumer ‘knows’ it to be higher), and so its payoff 
component reflecting this is -E2BDH. The game remains 
one of complete information as the players are assumed to 
know that other players will make different evaluations of 
the same risk, having chosen particular communication or 
interpretation strategies.  
To save space we do not give the adversary's payoff, 
but assume this is the sum of the losses inflicted on the 
legitimate actors, utility and consumer, less its cost of 
attack, A. This assumes that the utility and consumer are 
both right in the evaluations of their own payoffs, despite 
potentially different beliefs in the level of risk. In Fig. 1, 
[a] b : c denotes 'if a then b else c'. 
B. The second scenario: the spoofed or hoaxed attack 
In the second scenario, an attacker spoofs an attack by 
spuriously announcing an attack against a water utility on 
social media. The immediate object of the attack is the 
consuming public, and the public can choose whether to 
respond (for example incurring the costs of substitution by 
bottled water). It could choose to make no response, to 
avoid the cost and perhaps also anticipating that a 
response would encourage future attacks. The attacker can 
Adversary Utility Utility Consumer Message M, Belief L Utility payoff Pu Consumer payoff Pc 
Attacks Enhances Amplifies Inflates 2B, 4B -K + [T < 4B] - E1C : - E2BDH [T < 4B] -C : -4BDH 
   Accepts 2B, 2B -K + [T < 2B] - E1C : - E2BDH [T < 2B] -C : -2BDH 
   Discounts 2B, B -K + [T < B] - E1C : - E2BDH [T < B] -C : -BDH 
  Admits Inflates B, 2B -K + [T < 2B] - E1C : - E2BDH [T < 2B] -C : -2BDH 
   Accepts B, B -K + [T < B] - E1C : - E2BDH [T < B] -C : -BDH 
   Discounts B, 0.5B -K + [T < 0.5B] - E1C : - E2BDH [T < 0.5B] -C : -0.5BDH 
  Attenuates Inflates 0.5B, B -K + [T < B] - E1C : - E2BDH [T < B] -C : -BDH 
   Accepts 0.5B, 0.5B -K + [T < 0.5B] - E1C : - E2BDH [T < 0.5B] -C : -0.5BDH 
   Discounts 0.5B, 0.25B  -K + [T < 0.25B] - E1C : - E2BDH [T < 0.25B] -C : -0.25BDH 
 Maintains Amplifies Inflates 2B, 4B [T < 4B] - E1C : - E2BH [T < 4B] -C : -4BH 
   Accepts 2B, 2B [T < 2B] - E1C : - E2BH [T < 2B] -C : -2BH 
   Discounts 2B, B  [T < B] - E1C : - E2BH [T < B] -C : -BH 
  Admits Inflates B, 2B [T < 2B] - E1C : - E2BH [T < 2B] -C : -2BH 
   Accepts B, B [T < B] - E1C : - E2BH [T < B] -C : -BH 
   Discounts B, 0.5B [T < 0.5B] - E1C : - E2BH [T < 0.5B] -C : -0.5BH 
  Attenuates Inflates 0.5B, B [T < B] - E1C : - E2BH [T < B] -C : -BH 
   Accepts 0.5B, 0.5B [T < 0.5B] - E1C : - E2BH [T < 0.5B] -C : -0.5BH 
   Discounts 0.5B, 0.25B [T < 0.25B] - E1C : - E2BH [T < 0.25B] -C : -0.25BH 
Desists Enhances    -K 0 
 Maintains    0 0 
Figure 1.  Representation of the simple attack scenario 
choose to invest in amplifying its credibility – for example 
by hacking the utility’s customer communications systems 
but without staging an attack in reality. But, as a 2-player 
game, this ignores the way in which the attack on 
consumers’ psychological well-being is therefore also an 
attack on the utility, and the way in which a utility 
therefore has an incentive also to anticipate and act against 
such spoofing – for example by publicizing the strength of 
its controls, and even improving such controls.  
In reality, this is not a separate game from the previous 
one, since spoofing is a third option for the adversary's 
choice, to put beside a real attack and no action at all. But 
the game is somewhat different because the consumer 
finds out about the supposed attack from the attacker or its 
communication proxy (such as an anonymous news 
report), not from the utility. The utility might know that a 
spoof is a spoof and can choose to communicate this with 
the consumer. The considerations behind such 
communications could be different from those in the 
previous game: denying a spoof may lend it more 
credibility than ignoring it, and may damage the utility's 
reputation by suggesting it is complacent to those 
consumers who believe strongly in the spoof.  
A very simple version of a spoofing game is shown in 
Fig. 2. It is assumed here that the utility has the same 
choice to make about its defences, and the choice in its 
communications is now simply whether to deny the spoof 
or to ignore it. The consumer similarly has a binary choice 
of whether to believe the spoof is real or not. If it believes 
it to be real, it takes precautions at cost C and knows then 
there is no harm; if it believes it to be a spoof, it believes 
the payoff is zero. The utility’s payoffs include the cost of 
enhancing defences, K, but also the reputational costs Q 
and R of denying or ignoring a spoof that the consumer 
believes is real. The parameter A' is the modified cost to 
the attacker. It is assumed that the utility's choice to 
defend its system is unknown to the consumer, or at least 
uninfluential, so in the context of a spoof makes no 
difference to the consumer payoffs. Again the adversary's 
payoff is simply the negative sum of the other players' 
payoffs plus its cost of attack, -A’ - Pu - Pc. The structure 
for the initial analysis in the previous scenario is brought 
forward as Θi so the result is a single, more complex 
game. 
For illustration, we put the probabilities T = 0.2, B = 
0.3, D = 0.2, E1 = 0.4, E2 = 0.5. The payoffs, costs and 
harms are expressed as a subjective consequence, 
allowing the consequences experienced by the three 
players to be comparable. A payoff or certainty equivalent 
of 0 means a negligible subjective impact. A payoff of -10 
means a completely negative subjective effect. And one of 
+10 means a completely positive one. For illustration we 
put K = 3, C = 3, H = 9, A = 2, A’ = 0.5, Q = 4, R = 2.0. 
When the combined game is analysed with these payoffs, 
there turn out to be 8 pure-strategy Nash equilibria, in 
which the utility always enhances defences. But we 
suggest that a more descriptive analysis is obtained by 
using the 'Level-k' approach, recently used in the risk 
literature for an attacker-defender game [2]. This is 
defined recursively, such that a player playing at level 0 
makes a random choice, and a player playing at level k 
uses a maximin decision rule expecting other players to 
play at level k - 1. In our game, with the given parameters, 
level 2 plays are for the adversary to attack, for the utility 
not to enhance defences and amplify, and for the 
consumer to discount. The contrasting strategies in the 
equilibria and the level-k choices show how sensitive any 
prediction of a player's behaviour is to their game-
theoretic rationality. Only the equilibria include an 
adversary's choice of spoofing or desisting from an attack. 
C. The third scenario: the alleged attack as distraction 
In a third scenario, a producer either orchestrates an 
attack or claims that there is an attack as a distraction – 
typically from an act of neglect or negligence, or perhaps 
from weak financial performance, an unreliable water 
supply, or billing errors. Evidence of such scenarios is 
very hard to come by, for obvious reasons, but it is 
plausible, and in general such decoys provide an important 
social strategy for dealing with blame and responsibility. 
A report on the Ukrainian power grid attack argued that 
failures for other reasons are sometimes attributed to 
cyber-attacks [1]. A producer thus has a strategic choice of 
whether or not to initiate such a scenario. The other main 
player is the consumer, who can choose whether to behave 
as though there were no crisis, whether there were a crisis 
caused by an attack from a third party, or whether there 
were a crisis, but not as a result of such an attack. The 
payoffs concern reputation. This might have an effect on 
consumption, but is most likely to involve complaint, 
protest, lobbying, and political or regulatory action. Again 
on face value this is a 2-player game, between utility and 
public. But again, if less clearly, some real adversary has a 
role as a third player. It may receive a payoff: a positive 
payoff if it experiences benefit from being implicated in 
some crisis (whether or not it played a positive part in it); 
or a negative payoff if it is wrongly blamed for a crisis and 
the authorities act against it. If the crisis provokes an 
investment in risk controls, spuriously, it might gain in the 
sense that the utility thereby incurs an additional cost, or 
lose in the sense that a real attack will then be more costly. 
And it might have a choice whether to admit blame, 
untruthfully, or deny it. This choice will have some 
influence over the payoffs to the other two players. 
Unlike the previous two games, the state of the world at 
the start of the game is quite different: not the potential for 
a move from an attacker, but the occurrence of some event 
from which the utility might seek a distraction. There is no 
simple intersection with any of the choices in the previous 
games. The consumer has to gauge the credibility of the 
utility's communication, as in the first game, but it has the 
adversary's communication to judge in combination. The 










































Attacks Θi      
Spoofs Enhances Denies Believes 0, B -K - Q -C 
   Rejects 0, 0 -K 0 
  Ignores Believes -, B -K - R -C 
   Rejects -, 0 -K 0 
 Maintains Denies Believes 0, B -Q -C 
   Rejects 0, 0 0 0 
  Ignores Believes -, B -R -C 
   Rejects -, 0 0 0 
Desists Enhances    -K 0 
 Maintains    0 0 
Figure 2.  Representation of the spoofing scenario 
information and makes a sequential response, either 
disowning the attack or claiming (spuriously) it was theirs, 
with various costs and benefits. The consumer chooses an 
interpretation – no crisis, a crisis arising from an attack, or 
a crisis wrongly attributed to an attack – as last mover, but 
not knowing whether the utility announcement is a 
distraction, and not knowing whether the attacker's 
statement is true or not.  
In Fig. 3, in order to simplify, we ignore the question of 
whether there is a crisis or not, assuming that the 
consumer has objective knowledge on which it acts to 
protect itself. Instead, the figure depicts a game where the 
central issue is whether the consumer chooses to believe 
the utility’s claims of an attack. If the consumer chooses 
to believe the alleged attack, whether or not the adversary 
disowns a role in the attack, it suffers some subjective 
insecurity about attacks, I1. If it chooses to disbelieve it 
suffers a subjective insecurity about accidents or 
negligence, I2. The adversary’s reputation is enhanced to 
some degree by a supposed attack that it claims for itself, 
by W1, but only if the consumer believes it really was an 
attack. It is enhanced to a lesser degree W2 if it disowns 
the attack and yet the consumer still believes it was an 
attack. In both cases, however, it is then at risk from 
retaliation or prosecution, Z. If it claims an attack that the 
public disbelieves, the adversary loses some reputation, V. 
The utility also loses reputation N when the consumer 
disbelieves it, and makes some small gain in reputation M 
when the consumer believes it, on the basis that each time 
someone believes it that becomes more of a habit. The 
utility, if it does not attempt the distraction but admits to 
some other failure, also faces a reputational loss D.  
We do not take this specific scenario further, but simply 
use it to show that there are other games that can be 
identified around the security of a utility. Another 
possibility that this game has in common with the 
previous one is that of coalition. Clearly the utility and the 
consumer have interests in common. We suggested in the 
first scenario that some of the consumer's losses are 
reflected in the utility's payoff function. Perhaps more 
importantly, in any reasonably advanced society, the 
arrangements for compensation enforce a kind of 
coalition. But these arrangements are exogenous to the 
game and mean that the division of payoffs is not 
determined by the nature of specific games such as the 
ones represented here. It is also possible for ad hoc 
coalitions to form in principle, however, and this could be 
modelled in contexts where it is plausible. Equally, the 
basic representation could be extended into a conditional 
game [7], to deal with the social relationship between 
utility and consumer. It is potentially misleading to 
neglect this and to treat the players – especially utility and 
consumers – as isolated decision makers connected only 
through the game. 
But we return to the reality that the 'consumer' is a set 
of heterogeneous actors who, although they influence each 
other within a social network, have no central 
coordination. This is the second main theme of our paper, 
and so - rather than develop further scenarios - we now 
move on to modelling this aspect.  
III. THE MULTIPLE HETEROGENEOUS  
CONSUMER MODEL 
A. The agent based model 
The central issue for the consumer in the game theoretic 
model is how its payoff (and therefore the payoffs of 
utility and adversary) depends on its risk belief and action 
threshold. Its strategy does not involve choosing whether 
it protects itself or not, but how it forms its risk belief in 
the light of the utility's risk communication. This then 
decides whether precautionary measures are taken or not. 
This premise comes from recent work on 'social risk 
amplification' [8]. Both differential equation-based 
diffusion-like models [9, 10] and agent-based models [11] 
of social risk amplification have been developed to 
explore how the inhabitants of a social network respond to 
risk. The phenomenon is somewhat similar to the spread 
of physical viruses through an agent network [12]. In Figs. 
1 and 2, the single consumer (or homogenous consumer 
population) strategically decides how to interpret the 
utility's risk communication. We now replace this unitary 
decision maker with an agent population, and we give the 
agents simple decision rules that both 1) respond to a 
utility's risk communications, and 2) shape and are shaped 
by the risk beliefs of social neighbours. This agent-based 
model predicts the proportion of the agent population that 
takes precautionary measures, and it is this proportion that 
then shapes the payoffs in a reduced game. We describe 
the agent model briefly, and then show how the prediction 
is used in the main game. 
An individual within a consumer population, c Î C, 
exists in a social network G, an undirected graph in which 
its neighbours N(c) = {n Î C | (c, n) Î G}. The period of a 
crisis is divided into a large number T of discrete ‘ticks’, 
at each of which one consumer is chosen at random with 
equal probability for activation. It interacts with one 
neighbour n, chosen at random with equal probability 
from N(c). This interaction is itself a simple game of 
complete information in which the two consumers each 
decide whether to take precautionary action, ac Î {0, 1}. 
The payoffs from this local game involve both potential 
physical harm and social rewards. Consumer c believes 
the physical harm will be hc Î [0, 1] with probability qc if 
no precaution is taken, the cost of which is believed to be 
kcÎ [0, 1]. In terms of social rewards, c gains a subjective 
payoff of fc Î [0, 1] for conforming or being part of a 
consensus, and a subjective payoff uc Î [0, 1] for being 
regarded as being prudent (when it takes precautions). If c 
has a preference for the social approval of recklessness 
rather than prudence it gains a payoff of 1 – uc (when it 
takes no precaution). This sets up a local game for every 
consumer-consumer interaction as shown in normal form 
Fig. 4. We use the 'Level-k' approach, described briefly 
above, with k = 2 to model the decisions of both parties in 
all interactions.  





























Distracts Claims Believes W1-Z M -I1 
  Disbelieves -V -N -I2 
 Disowns Believes W2-Z M -I1 
  Disbelieves 0 -N -I2 
Admits   0 -D 0 
Figure 3.  Representation of the distraction scenario 
The traits, fc and uc, are randomly endowed from a beta 
distribution with specified modes, minima and maxima, 
and are fixed for the duration of the model. The beliefs hc 
and kc are also randomly endowed and fixed. The belief in 
the probability of harm, qc, is randomly endowed (with 
very small mode) at the start of the model period, before a 
crisis begins. When c is active, it takes a weighted average 
of its prior belief and the risk level b (a probability of 
incurring harm) being broadcast by the utility, which is 
zero until a crisis starts. Thus qc(t) = rcb(t) + (1 – rc) qc(t-
1), where the weight rc is the consumer c’s credulity or 
acceptance of the utility’s risk message, another randomly 
endowed and fixed trait. The value of qc(t) weights the 
harm in the payoffs of the interaction game in Fig. 4. 
The utility’s broadcast risk level b is the product of an 
objective risk level B and a chosen amplification factor (2, 
1 or 0.5) – both inherited from the overall game specified 
earlier. Thus the agent model is parameterized by the 
amplification factor: we get a different model, and 
different outcome, for the different amplification choices 
made by the utility, as in the original game. In this way, 
over the model period, the consumers’ beliefs in the 
probability of some harm evolve over time, in response to 
the utility’s broadcast and their own earlier beliefs. And 
their choice of whether or not to take precautionary action 
develops both in response to this changing probability 
belief and to the socially strategic interaction with their 
neighbours defined by this game.  
The agent model was simulated with a simple system of 
1000 consumers connected in a scale-free social network 
with a power law distribution of link numbers k in which 
the number of nodes with k links is proportional to k -γ. 
This applies to many networks of social contacts, in which 
g generally lies in the range of 2 to 3 [13]. We set g = 2.5. 
Modal values of the fixed endowments for kc, uc, fc, rc, hc 
were 0.7, 0.5, 0.7, 0.9 and 0.8. The objective value of risk, 
B = 0.3, as in the game described earlier. To use the 
outcome in the game, we use the peak values of the 
fraction of the consumer population taking precautionary 
measures. It is this peak response that is probably most 
relevant to the other two players (the utility and the 
adversary). As the model is stochastic, we generate a 
frequency distribution over this peak value for 1000 runs 
of the agent model simulation. 
B. Using the results of the agent model 
The first part of the game (based on the first scenario) 
now appears as in Fig. 5. There is no unitary consumer to 
make strategic plays. The consumer payoff is determined 
by the peak proportion X of consumers in the consuming 
population who take precautions when given the risk 
message that defines the utility's communication strategy. 
Using the parameters from earlier, the net consumer 
payoff would be -XC - (1 - X)BDH when the utility has 
chosen to defend, or -XC + (1 - X)BH when it has not. It is 
important to say that these payoffs, although incurred by 
the consumer population, are not the payoffs of a 
consumer player. The consumer is no longer a strategic 
actor in the game, and its payoff is needed only because it 
contributes to the adversary's payoff. The net utility 
payoff, using the same approach as earlier, is -K -X E1C - 
(1 - X) E2BDH (if the utility defends) or -X E1C - (1 - X) 
E2BH (if it does not defend). The adversary's payoff as 
before is the sum of the negative payoffs to the utility and 
consumers, less its own cost. The game is now simpler in 
structure, with two players, but with payoffs defined by 
probability distributions over the consumer response. In 
Fig. 5, XM is subscripted to denote that its distribution FX 
(M) depends on M through the operation of the agent 
model. 
Limitations of space preclude description of the 
extension into the second scenario, involving spoof 
attacks. This requires a similar agent model, with the 
utility's denial or ignoring of the spoof as an exogenous 
variable. Instead we move on to the final element of our 
method: the analysis of the game when we end up, as here, 
with payoffs defined using random outcomes rather than 
crisp values. 
IV. THE ANALYSIS OF A GAME WITH  
STOCHASTIC PAYOFFS 
As the consumer model revolves around perceptions of 
risk, and as we essentially take a risk perspective on this 
analysis, it is natural to deal with the probability 
distributions defining the payoffs by using a risk index. 
Recently, MacKenzie [14] has proposed using Value At 
Risk (VaR), which originated in the context of financial 
risk, more widely. VaR is based on choosing a specific 
quantile in a probability distribution over a payoff in order 
to summarize a distribution by stating how great a harm, 
or more, should be expected with a certain probability. 
Thus VaR0.01[FZ] indicates that there is 0.01 probability of 
a harm of at least that value of Z, given a probability 
distribution FZ over payoff Z. The conditional value at 
risk, CVaR0.01, is the expected value of losses given that 
they exceed the value at risk [14].  
If a 1% VaR adequately represents the utility’s risk 
attitude, the critical criterion for the utility is to choose a 
strategy that minimizes the worst VaR0.01. For the 
adversary, the support for its payoff distribution will 
normally be mostly positive. And its decision rule is likely 
to be a lot less conservative. But it will still reasonably 
maximin over its gains, and its payoffs can still reasonably 
be summarised by a quantile, for example VaR0.10. This 
means that the adversary payoff is no longer the simple 
sum of the legitimate actor harms with the adversary’s 
costs – since its view of the legitimate actor harms is 
summarized with a different VaR index. The agent model 
Adversary Utility Utility Utility payoff Pu 
Attacks Enhances Amplifies -K - XME1C - (1 - XM)E2BDH  
  Admits -K - XME1C - (1 - XM)E2BDH  
  Attenuates -K - XME1C - (1 - XM)E2BDH  
 Maintains Amplifies -XME1C - (1 - XM)E2BH  
  Admits -XME1C - (1 - XM)E2BH  
  Attenuates -XME1C - (1 - XM)E2BH  
Desists Enhances  -K 
 Maintains  0 
Figure 5. Revised game with consumer responses from agent model  
  Consumer n 
  Takes 
precaution 
Takes no precaution 
Consumer c  Takes 
precaution 
uc + fc – kc,  
un + fn - kn 
uc – kc, 
(1 – un) – qnhn 
Takes no 
precaution 
(1 – uc) – qchc 
un - kn 
(1 – uc) + fc – qchc, 
(1 – un) + fn – qnhn 
Figure 4. Local game for consumer interactions 
outcome, the proportion of consumers taking precautions 
X, is the only random variable. So, for example, for the 
strategy combination <adversary attacks, utility defends, 
utility amplifies> the utility’s payoff is VaR0.01[-K - 
XME1C - (1 - XM)E2BDH] = -K - VaR0.01[FX (2B)]E1C - (1 - 
VaR0.01[FX (2B)])E2BDH. The adversary’s payoff is -A - K  
- VaR0.10[FX (2B)](1 + E1)C - (1 - VaR0.10[FX (2B)])(1 + 
E2)BDH. 
The results of applying this to the game in Fig. 5, using 
parameter values carried over from the 3-player game 
where appropriate, produces a single equilibrium where 
the adversary attacks and the utility both enhances 
defences and amplifies its risk message. The level-2 
strategy for the adversary is to attack, but for the utility to 
maintain (not enhance) its defences and to amplify.  
Much more elaborate approaches to dealing with 
payoffs as probability distributions have been developed, 
replacing distributions with the sequence of their moments 
and applying them to a mixed strategy solution for a game 
[15]. This provides an avenue for further work. But, in the 
same way that level-k game strategies capture how actors 
might actually reason, in reality, the use of a VaR index 
expresses an intuitive and straightforward way in which 
actors can actually reason about uncertain payoffs. Actors 
do not have to exhibit unrealistic levels of technical 
rationality, and do not have to assume this of other actors 
against whom they play.  
V. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS 
The intended contribution is to show how we can model 
utility cyber-security risks – and more generally how we 
can model situations in which there is strategic action not 
just between an adversary and a defender, but among 
adversary, defender and a third party that bears much of 
the risk of any attack. In the simplest approach, this leads 
to a 3-player game with a set of parameterized payoffs. 
This combines the traditional view of an adversary-
defender game with a game involving risk 
communications among the ‘good guys’ – the utility and 
its consumers – a game that is important in defining 
whether consumers then take precautionary action. 
Strategies indicated by different analyses – for example 
Nash equilibria and level-k decision rules – are quite 
different, showing how sensitive the strategies and 
ultimate outcomes are to what we assume about the 
rationality of the players. In a more refined approach, we 
show how to replace the idea of the third party (in this 
case the ‘consumer’) as a unitary decision maker with a 
heterogeneous population in which agents are mutually 
influencing, but not centrally coordinated. Again, how the 
consumer population interprets the utility’s risk 
communications is important, but so is the way in which 
consumers observe and interpret each other’s risk 
responses in defining the response of the population as a 
whole. The outcomes of this agent-based model lead to 
stochastic payoffs and the need to analyse games with this 
property, for which we suggest the Value at Risk index. 
There are several limitations in the basic 
conceptualization of a 3-player game. The reality of the 
risk of cyber-attacks on utilities is that there are more than 
three actors. Regulators, journalists and politicians may be 
involved, and themselves have strategic interests. Recent 
work, for example, deals with governments as actors who 
make disclosures about critical utilities [16]. Our 
particular 3-player game is also perhaps the simplest that 
could be envisaged in this context, so in reality the 
available strategies and payoff structures may both be 
more complex. And there are basic questions about the 
completeness of this game: it seems unlikely that the 
players can have the comprehensive knowledge of each 
other’s payoffs that the game assumes. The agent-based 
model with which we model the heterogeneous consumer 
population similarly is based on a basic set of assumptions 
about the social network and individual agent decision 
rules that do not fully represent the relevant mechanisms 
within such a population. 
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